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Abstract
We analyze the price pass-through effect of the minimum wage and use the results to
provide insight into the competitive structure of low-wage labor markets. Using monthly price
series, we find that the pass-through effect is entirely concentrated on the month that the
minimum wage change goes into effect, and is much smaller than what the canonical literature
has found. We then discuss why our results differ from that literature, noting the impact of series
interpolation in generating most of the previous results. We then use the variation in the size of
the minimum wage change to evaluate the competitive nature of low-wage labor markets.
Finally, we exploit the rich variation in minimum wage policy of the last 10 to 15 years—
including the rise of state- and city-level minimum wage changes and the increased use of
indexation—to investigate how the extent of price pass-through varies by policy context. This
paper contributes to the literature by clarifying our understanding of the dynamics and magnitude
of the pass-through effect and enriching the discussion of how different policies may impact that
effect.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, in the face of federal inaction to raise the minimum wage, states and cities
have increasingly passed their own minimum wage laws. These state and city laws promoted a
renaissance in the study of the employment effect of minimum wage hikes as they not only
created greater numbers of minimum wage changes to be studied using then-standard techniques
but also created “natural experiments” that permitted alternative techniques to be used to identify
the employment impact of minimum wages. Two branches of minimum wage research
developed starting in the 1990s. One branch found that, contrary to the previously accepted
belief, some minimum wage hikes led to either no decline in employment but potentially
increased employment (e.g., Card and Krueger 1994, 1995; Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010). A
second branch found evidence supporting the claim that minimum wage hikes reduced
employment (e.g., Neumark 2001; Neumark and Wascher 2002, 2007, 2008).1
An additional important, although less-studied, question about the impact of minimum wage
hikes is the impact such hikes have on output prices, the so-called “pass-through” effect. Early
studies include Wessels (1980) and Card and Krueger (1995). The most influential of these
studies, however, have been a series of papers by Aaronson and coauthors. Aaronson (2001),
Aaronson and French (2006), Aaronson and French (2007), and Aaronson, French, and
MacDonald (2008) find evidence that minimum wage hikes increase output prices and that the
size of this pass-through suggests that the increased cost associated with a minimum wage hike is
completely passed along to consumers.2 Aaronson and coauthors also developed an argument
that their findings support the claim that low-wage labor markets are highly competitive and, by
implication, that minimum wage hikes necessarily lower employment. This literature on passthough, then, is important both in itself and because it sheds indirect light on the on-going debate
over the employment effect of minimum wage hikes.
This paper contributes to the literature on price pass-through by presenting more accurate
estimates of the pass-through effect than found in the previous literature, and by using these
results to give insight into the competitive structure of low-wage labor markets. We find that the
extent of pass-through is much smaller than previously reported and that the behavior of this
pass-through is more consistent with monopsonistic competition than it is with perfect
competition. Additionally, we exploit the rich variation in minimum wage policy—the rise of
state- and city-level minimum wages, as well as the increased use of indexation of the minimum
1

Explanations for small negative or positive employment effects included the existence of various market frictions
arising from imperfect competition or search (e.g. Bhaskar and To 1999; Lang and Khan 1998).
2
The studies citied above are for the US. Lemos (2008) provides a survey of the literature.
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wage to the CPI in areas such as Florida, Washington, Ohio, and San Francisco—to investigate
how the extent of pass-through varies by policy context.
2. Literature Review and Contribution to the Literature
Previous empirical studies have documented that minimum wage hikes produce substantial
price pass-through effects. The oft-cited study by Aaronson (2001) estimated the magnitude of
the pass-through using metropolitan-area food away from home (FAFH) CPI data between 1978
and 1995. In the base specification (pg. 162 of his article) which included only monthly and
yearly controls, the cumulative wage-price elasticity from 3 months before up to 3 months after a
minimum wage hike was estimated at about 0.07, meaning that a 10% increase in the minimum
wage is associated with a 0.7% increase in FAFH prices.
Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) used micro-level restaurant price data for the
period between 1995 and 1997, during which two changes to the federal minimum wage were
implemented, to generate a wage-price elasticity of, again, about 0.07. Behind this average price
increase was substantial variation: prices for some restaurant items grew faster than this average,
while prices for other items grew slower than the average, and some prices even fell after a
minimum wage hike. The price increase was also higher in limited-service restaurants than it was
in full-service restaurants. Though the empirical literature is somewhat limited outside of these
two formative works (see Lemos 2008 for a review), other studies have found similar results in
other countries and other cases.3 The magnitude of the pass-through has been presented as being
consistent with what models of a perfectly competitive labor market would predict about the size
of the pass-through, assuming standard values for demand elasticities of fast-food and capitallabor elasticities (Aaronson and French 2007; Aaronson, French, and MacDonald 2008).4 An
increase in the minimum wage increases the marginal cost of labor, reduces employment, lowers
output, and raises prices. This work on the pass-through therefore speaks to the on-going
controversy about the competitive structure of low-wage labor markets.
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Other studies include Fougère, Gautier, Bihan (2010) who studied France, Lemos (2006) who studied Brazil, and
Wadsworth (2010) and Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011) who both studied the U.K.
4
Although the overall thrust of the existing empirical literature on minimum wage hike pass-though is to support the
claim that labor markets for restaurants are best characterized by competition, the evidence is not unambiguous. For
instance, Aaronson and French (2007, p.696) write after their analysis of BLS micro price data for restaurants,
“Given that some restaurants do not increase their prices after minimum wage hikes, but restaurants that do raise
their prices usually do by more than 0.7 percent, it is difficult to compare the observed price response to the
competitive prediction.”
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Policy and academic work has frequently cited the above studies by Aaronson and coauthors as the authoritative studies on minimum wages and pass-through.5 However, these
studies deserve to be updated for a couple of reasons.
First, these studies rely on data from no later than 1997 but since then we have seen an
increase in the variation of minimum wage policy across several dimensions.6 For instance, since
1997 we have seen a profusion of state and city minimum wage laws whose effect we cannot
assume are identical to federal minimum wage hikes. Further, some states and cities have
implemented laws that provide for scheduled increases in their minimum wage often indexed to
some measure of price inflation. In this way, these new policies differ from the majority of
minimum wages investigated by Aaronson and co-authors which were often large, one-shot
increases implemented with relatively little warning to businesses. Again, we cannot presume
these new types of minimum wage hikes affect prices, or more generally the economy, in the
same way minimum wage changes implemented before 1997 did. Indeed, one contribution of our
study is to present a comparative analysis of different types of minimum wage policies within a
common data and econometric setting.
Table 1 details the differences between the minimum wages considered by Aaronson and coauthors with those we consider in this study. The table shows that state-level minimum wage
increases are much more common—and federal-level increases much less common—after 1998.
Other variations in policy such as indexed, city minimum wages, or perpetually scheduled
minimum wage increases were absent or nearly absent from the period considered by the
previous studies.
[Table 1]
Second, we use the data differently than how Aaronson (2001) used it to give additional
insight into the process of pass-through. For instance, we treat monthly and bimonthly price
series separately (instead of combining them as did Aaronson (2001)) to better reveal the
dynamics of pass-through pricing. Furthermore, by embracing the complicating factor of
multiple-state metropolitan areas (instead of avoiding it as did Aaronson (2001)) we more
accurately measure the impact of different types of minimum wage increases, and are thereby
able to shed additional light on the competitive nature of low-wage labor markets. Finally, by
using data after 1997 we are able to use CPI data that are less affected by various biases (such as

5

Most of the later pass-through literature cites this paper as the canonical example, as well as much of the rest of the
literature on the effects of the minimum wage such as Dube et al. (2010) and MaCurdy (2015).
6
The use of data from this period continues up to present studies, as seen in MaCurdy (2015) , who uses data from
1996, and from a single federal minimum wage increase, to draw conclusions about all minimum wages.
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substitution bias) that was not available to Aaronson (2001); this will again permit us to generate
more accurate estimates of the extent of pass-through.
Looking ahead to the results, our first main finding is that pass-through is primarily
concentrated on the month that the minimum wage hike goes into effect, with no appreciable
impact on the month before or after. This finding contradicts the previous work. Second, we
estimate wage-price elasticities are notably lower than reported in previous work: we find prices
grow by 0.36% for every 10% increase in the minimum wage, which is almost half of the
previously accepted 0.7%.7 Third, we find the behavior of pass-though is consistent with market
power on the demand-side of low-skilled labor markets (e.g. monopsony or monopsonistic
competition), which sheds light on one of the more contentious issues in the debates over the
employment impact of minimum wage hikes. We also find that not all minimum wage hikes are
the same. For instance, small, scheduled minimum wage hikes have smaller impacts on prices
than large, one-time minimum wage hikes. Yet, we find no significant differences between stateand federal-level minimum wage increases, even though we might expect business flight to have
a larger impact in the case of state-level minimum wage changes.
3.	
  Data	
  and	
  Data	
  Transformations	
  
The dependent variable in this study is the change in the log of food away from home CPI
(FAFH CPI), a price index generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for select U.S.
metropolitan areas. FAFH includes food purchased and consumed outside of the home, and for
the most part includes items sold at full- and limited-service restaurants.8 This data is available at
the BLS website. We include in our analysis all metropolitan areas that have either monthly or
bimonthly FAFH data for at least part of the period of our study, 1977-2015, which gives us 28
series.9
7

This 0.036 elasticity is similar to what was found by Card and Krueger (1995, p. 54) in their study of a single
minimum wage increase in New Jersey.
8
Additionally, FAFH includes ready-to-eat food purchased at motels and restaurants, food provided at employer and
school sites, along with food purchased at vending machines and from mobile vendors. See BLS, Handbook on
Methods, Chapter 17. For conciseness, we will refer in the text to “restaurants” when we talk about the group of sites
considered as selling food away from home.
9
Using the major city within the area to identify them, the metropolitan areas included in our study are: Anchorage
(bimonthly, until 1986), Atlanta (bimonthly, full time period), Baltimore (bimonthly, until 1995), Boston
(bimonthly, full period), Buffalo (bimonthly, until 1986), Chicago (monthly, full period), Cincinnati (bimonthly,
until 1986), Cleveland (bimonthly, full period), Baltimore/Washington D.C. (bimonthly, since 1995), Washington
D.C. (bimonthly, until 1995), Dallas (bimonthly, full period), Denver (bimonthly, until 1986), Detroit (monthly until
1986, then bimonthly for rest of period), Honolulu (bimonthly, until 1986), Houston (bimonthly, full period),
Kansas City (bimonthly, until 1986), Los Angeles (monthly, full time period), Miami (bimonthly, full period),
Milwaukee (bimonthly, until 1986), Minneapolis (bimonthly, until 1986), New York City (monthly, full period),
Philadelphia (monthly until 1997, then bimonthly for rest of period), Pittsburgh (bimonthly, until 1997), Portland
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We begin our analysis in 1978 because that is the year that Aaronson (2001) started his
analysis. The minimum wage increase in 1978 was also the first one after the implementation of
changes in the Fair Labor Standards Act that directly affected the restaurant industry (for
instance, a restructured tip credit process and a repeal of the partial exemption of restaurant
employees from overtime rules) along with the expansion of the minimum wage to all covered,
non-exempt employees. Thus, 1978 was the first year in which minimum wage changes would
affect all minimum wage workers regardless of occupational status or industry, giving our
estimates more consistency than if we relied on earlier data where different minimum wages
affected different subsets of workers.10
One characteristic of the CPI data requires comment. In January 1999, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics switched to a geometric mean formula when they calculated CPI price indexes. This
switch was prompted by arguments that the BLS’s method for calculating the CPI before 1999
produced an upward bias to the CPI and its subcomponents. The new geometric mean formula
could mimic consumers’ substitution between the products they buy in response to changes in
relative prices, something the previously used Laspeyres formula did not do.11 If the CPI was
biased upwards before 1999, then any study of the size of the pass-through that uses pre-1999
CPI data, such as Aaronson (2001), presents estimates of the pass-through that are potentially
biased upwards. Our study, which uses data for 1978-2015, is able to use the more accurate
geometric mean-based CPI for the second half of the period and, so, is able to generate more
accurate estimates of pass-through.
The main independent variable of interest in our regression is the change in (binding)
minimum wage rates. Our data on minimum wages comes from various issues of the Monthly
Labor Review, state Department of Labor reports, and, for San Francisco, San Jose, Oakland,
Berkeley, Washington, D.C., and Prince George’s and Montgomery counties, city and county
ordinances. As indicated in Table 2 (below), the years 1978 to 2015 saw 11 federal minimum
wage increases, 126 binding state minimum wage increases, and 23 city minimum wage
increases. Table 2 reports the month and year of passage for all of these increases.
[Table 2]

(bimonthly, until 1986), San Diego (bimonthly, until 1986), San Francisco (monthly between 1987 and 1997,
bimonthly for the rest of the series), Seattle (bimonthly until 1986 and then from 1997 for the rest of the period), St.
Louis (bimonthly until 1997).
10
See, for instance, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm.
11
Dalton, Greenlees, and Stewart (1998) provides an overview of this change.
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We also include, in most of our regressions, control variables such as month, year, and a
metropolitan area fixed-effects. One additional control is “CPI-All” (Urban Consumers),12
included to take into account various unknown determinants of FAFH CPI inflation. The
inclusion of the latter control variable might rob some of the influence from minimum wage
changes as this control variable is affected by inflation in the FAFH sector. As will be seen,
however, this does not seem to be a problem, as when CPI-All is included in our regressions it
has virtually no effect on our main coefficients of interest.
The BLS generates FAFH CPI for multistate metropolitan areas by using prices from
restaurants located in more than one state. For example, in the case of the New York-Northern
New Jersey-Long Island metropolitan area, the FAFH CPI is constructed from prices taken from
a sample of restaurants located in four states: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. Therefore, the FAFH CPI for this single multistate metropolitan area is potentially
affected by minimum wage hikes implemented by four different states. Table 3 (below) provides
information about the metropolitan areas in our sample that include territory from more than a
single state.
[Table 3]
The existence of multistate metropolitan areas provides a benefit to this study. We are able
to include in our dataset many more state minimum wage changes than would have been the case
if, say, the New York metropolitan area only included territory from New York State alone. We
need a way to transform a single-state minimum wage increase affecting only restaurants in one
portion of in a multistate metropolitan area into a variable measuring its impact on average
FAFH prices in the full metropolitan area. We will tentatively presume that a 10% state
minimum wage hike that affects only 20% of the restaurants in a metropolitan area (that is, those
restaurants in that state) will be equal to a 2% (10% x 20%) minimum wage hike for the whole
metropolitan area. We will define the “restaurant-weighted state minimum wage change”
(RSMW) as,
∆! log  (𝑚𝑤!"∗ ) =   

! 𝜆!"#

∗ ∆! log  (𝑚𝑤!"# )

(1)

where i is the metropolitan area, s is the state, t is the month, λist is the proportion of restaurants
from state s in month t in metropolitan area i, and mwst is the minimum wage change in state s in
time t.13
12

Published by the BLS and available on their website.
For example, consider the District of Columbia in 2009. That series is composed partly of counties in Maryland,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Factoring in the number of restaurant establishments in each of these subsamples of
counties as a percent of the total establishments in those counties gives the following weight to apply to each state’s
13
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When a metropolitan area includes only a single state, λist will equal 1 and the RSMW for
any minimum wage will simply be the change in the associated state minimum wage. The
number of restaurant establishments in the various state subsections of multistate metropolitan
areas comes from County Business Patterns while information about the particular towns and
cities included in each state subsection of a metropolitan area comes from the definitions of these
metropolitan areas provided by the Office of Management and Budget.14
An additional noteworthy characteristic of our data is that some of the price series are
available monthly while other price series are only available bimonthly. (The same holds true for
the data used on Aaronson (2001) and related studies.) Table 4 (below) breaks down the total
number of binding minimum wage hikes in our sample by whether the affected price series
reports monthly or bimonthly observations.
[Table 4]
As can be seen, the monthly price series has connected with them a range of federal and
state minimum wage increases, but the number of monthly observations is much less than the
number of observations we have for the bimonthly data. Good reason exists, then, to use the
information included in the bimonthly data in this study as it permits us to take into account a far
wider range of minimum wage increases. Yet, the bimonthly data is not granular enough to
permit a consideration of details about the dynamic (here, monthly) impact of the pricing process
set in motion by a minimum wage hike.
In summary, we estimate price pass-through due to the minimum wage by using the food
away from home price index for 28 cities between 1978 and 2015. We also use each city’s CPIAll as a control variable. Since some cities are in fact composed of multiple states, we are able to
incorporate additional minimum wage changes into our analysis. We apply a weighting scheme
to our minimum wage change variable that draws on County Business Pattern data on the
number of restaurant establishments in each city’s sample area. We will use both monthly data
minimum wage in order to construct the District of Columbia minimum wage variable: D.C. (0.164), Maryland
(0.344), Virginia (0.471), West Virginia (0.020). Thus, if Maryland increased its minimum wage in January 2009 by
10%, this would be a full metropolitan area equivalent minimum wage change of 3.44% (=10% x 0.344). We
tentatively propose, in this case, that a 10% increase in the minimum wage in Maryland would have the same impact
on prices in the wider District of Columbia metropolitan area as would a 3.44% increase in the federal minimum
wage. The equality of these two impacts is, of course, debatable and we address it below.
14
The BLS’s Handbook on Methods, Chapter 17, describes in general terms the way that they select outlets to use as
their source of prices. The BLS attempts to select these outlets so they reflect where people are buying their food.
We use the regional distribution of restaurant establishments as a proxy for the regional distribution of restaurant
purchases. This is an imperfect proxy as regional differences in restaurant sizes and regional differences in average
consumer restaurant bills might lead the distribution of restaurant purchases to vary from the regional distribution of
restaurant establishments. We also used population weights in place of restaurant establishment weights, but the
results we got from using population weights did not different much from what is reported in the text.
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and bimonthly data in our study. In the following section, we discuss our empirical model and
present preliminary results using monthly data on food away from home prices.
4. Estimates of Pass-Through with Monthly Data
Our two initial tasks are to: (1) estimate the extent of pass-through and (2) discover when
this pass-through occurs (i.e., either only contemporaneously with the imposition of the
minimum wage hike or also in the months before and/or after the hike is imposed). We can
accomplish both these tasks simultaneously if we limit ourselves to monthly price series only.
The bimonthly price series are not granular enough to reveal the detailed monthly dynamics of
the pass-through process and so we temporarily set them aside. The downside of this approach is
that we are only able to consider the impact of 82 of the 354 minimum wage hikes appearing in
our full sample (see Table 4) and limit ourselves to using less than half the total data we have
available.
The subsample used in this section comes from the three metropolitan areas (New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles) that have monthly data for the entire period and from three additional
metropolitan areas (San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Detroit) that have monthly data for some
subset of the period 1978-2015. Monthly observations were reported for San Francisco between
1986 and 1998, for Philadelphia before 1998, and for Detroit before 1987. We do not use the
bimonthly data from these metropolitan areas from outside these years. Together, these
metropolitan areas account for only about 20% of all federal-level minimum wage increases and
about 30% of all state-level minimum wage increases in our sample.
We estimate the equation below, which has Food Away from Home (FAFH) inflation as
the dependent variable and, as independent variables, the weighted log difference in the
minimum wage mw* (defined in Equation 1), overall metropolitan area CPI inflation, along with
metropolitan area, month, and year fixed effects as independent variables:
∆ log 𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐻

!"

=𝛼+

!
!!!! 𝛽!

∗ ∆log  (𝑚𝑤!"∗ ) + 𝜃 ∗ log 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐶𝑃𝐼

!"

+ 𝑐! + 𝜖!" (2)

This regression includes leads and lags of four months as we want to capture the impact of a
minimum wage hike on prices in the months both preceding and following the month on which a
minimum wage hike is implemented.
Table 5 reports our findings. As we go from regression 1 to regression 3, we add month and
year dummies along with the metropolitan area’s overall CPI as controls. Regression 3, which
adds City CPI-All and shows that it is significant, is used as the basis for the discussion below.
9

[Table 5]
In regression 3 the contemporary elasticity is 0.039, a value that is statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. We also get a statistically significant negative coefficient four months
before the minimum wage is imposed, but no other coefficients achieve statistical significance in
either regression 2 or 3.15 According to the monthly data, then, a minimum wage hike leads to a
price increase only in the month it is imposed. In that month, a 10% increase in the minimum
wage is associated with a 0.39% increase in the FAFH CPI. We also find that prices also grow
slower four months ahead of a minimum wage hike, as indicated by the statistically significant
(p-value of 0.015) coefficient of -0.014 for T-4. When we take into consideration the net effect
on prices over the 9-month period centered on the minimum wage hike, we find a 10% increase
in the minimum wage leads to a net increase in FAFH CPI of 0.25%.
These findings are different from what Aaronson (2001) reported. For instance, he reports
statistically significant price increases in the month before and the month after a minimum wage
hike is imposed whereas we find no such effect in those months. Aaronson also reports a much
larger pass-through than we do: he finds that in the 9 months surrounding a minimum wage hike
a 10% increase boosts prices by 0.67%.16 Our finding of 0.25% is less than half of what
Aaronson found. We will defer further comment on these differences until we discover what our
full sample (including both monthly and bimonthly data) says about these differences.
We have one interesting finding in common with Aaronson (2001): we both find a
statistically significant negative coefficient four months in advance of a minimum wage hike.
The elasticities we find are nearly identical, -0.014 for us and -0.013 for Aaronson.17 That prices
grow slower in advance of a minimum wage is hard to square with a perfectly competitive
setting, in which businesses only respond to actual changes in costs. Further, that an anticipated
increase in future costs might lead to a moderating of price increases ahead of this increase is
quite interesting and we can only speculate about the mechanism behind this behavior. If this
finding—of slower growth in prices in advance of a minimum wage increase—is confirmed by
regressions using our full sample, one implication might be that studies of the impact of the
minimum wage (either on prices or even on employment) that limit their focus to a couple of
15

The finding that only a single lead or lag in regressions 2 or 3 achieves statistical significance is evidence against
the potential claim of endogeneity—i.e., that minimum wage policy is partly a response to inflation. Because the
dependent variable is the percentage change in FAFH prices, a potential endogeneity problem reflects the idea that
minimum wage hikes occur during periods of escalating inflation. The fact that the majority of coefficients for the
leads and lags are not statistically significant from zero indicates that this sort of endogeneity is not an issue in our
regressions.
16
Table 4, regression 2 in Aaronson (2001)
17
Aaronson (2001), Table 4, Regression 2. Aaronson has little to say about this statistically significant coefficient.
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months before and after the minimum wage hike might be missing part of the response they are
trying to measure.
5. Using Interpolated Data
Following Aaronson (2001), we will join our monthly and bimonthly series to create a larger
single dataset. By joining these two types of data, we expand the number of minimum wages we
account for from 82 to 354. The first step in joining these two types of data is transforming,
through a process of interpolation, the underlying bimonthly data into monthly series before that
data is logged and then joined with logged values of the (actual) monthly series. Performing this
joining increases the number of observations we have from 1852 to 8124.18
In much of the econometric literature, interpolation involves transforming quarterly data into
monthly data or transforming annual data into quarterly data. Further, the interpolation often
involves using related higher frequency data to inform the process (e.g., Chow and Lin (1971)).
In our study, the frequency change is much smaller (from bimonthly to monthly) and we
transform the data in a setting in which no related higher frequency data exists. Therefore, we
interpolate by simply averaging the neighboring bimonthly data and, where appropriate, splicing
information about the minimum wage hikes that occurred (contemporaneously, with leads, or
with lags) onto the interpolated monthly series.
Any interpolation process creates something akin to measurement error in the resulting
interpolated data points. In our case, by interpolated values for some metropolitan areas for
FAFH CPI and City CPI-All, we must treat the dependent variable and one independent variable
as if they were measured with error. This raises the possibility that both the coefficients and
standard errors produced by regressions using this data are biased. The precise nature of these

18

The 8124 observations include 1852 monthly observations, 3136 bimonthly observations, and 3136 interpolated
observations. However, the degrees of freedom used to calculate standard error in regressions using all these
observations will be less than the number of observations. In general, the degrees of freedom is equal to the number
of independent pieces of information that goes into the estimation of a parameter. Some of our interpolated data is
not independent as it has been generated from a linear combination of the bimonthly data on either side of it and, so,
such interpolated data does not add independent information. However, some of our interpolated data might be seen
as adding new information. For instance, when we generate a monthly observation for January by interpolating
bimonthly FAFH data for December and February in some cases we add to this observation new information: that a
minimum wage hike occurred in January. Arguably, the latter type of interpolated data does add some new
information, and so it might be seen to add an additional degree of freedom to our regression procedures. Yet, this
new information is embedded in some not-new information (the interpolated part). We take the conservative
approach by assuming that none of the interpolated data contributes degrees of freedom to our estimates of standard
errors. So, for instance, if a regression uses the largest dataset (8124 observations) we will use 4988 (=1852+3136)
as the starting point for our determination of the degrees of freedom for the standard errors for the coefficients for
these regressions.
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biases will depend, of course, on the nature of the measurement error and the particular
estimation technique used. We will consider each in turn.
Interpolation will likely generate “pseudo-measurement” errors for FAFH CPI that are
positive both for the month preceding a minimum wage hike (T-1) and for the month following
such hikes (T+1). Interpolation will also likely generate pseudo-measurement errors that are
negative for the month of a minimum wage hike. The argument that the pseudo-measurement
errors have these signs (on average) is simple. First, we assume that the impact of minimum
wages on prices in a metropolitan area is unrelated to whether the BLS collects monthly or
bimonthly FAFH CPI data for that metropolitan area. If that is the case, we can use the results of
our monthly regressions above to say that in metropolitan areas that collect bimonthly data
minimum wage hikes lead to increases in prices on the month of the hike but not in the month
before or after.
The upper-half of Figure 1 portrays a stylized pattern of FAFH prices when a minimum
wage hike is imposed. In this figure, we presume prices growth smoothly except for in the month
of the minimum wage hike (on month 0). Now assume that only bimonthly data was collected
for this metropolitan area (on month -2, month 0, and month +2, etc). In the lower-half of Figure
1 the points a, c, and d are the actual data we have. If we linearly interpolate between a and c
(indicated by the plus sign) we can see our interpolated value for -1 to exceeds the actual data
point b. As a result of this, the growth rate in FAFH prices from -2 to -1 will be larger than it
really is while that from -1 to 0 will be smaller than it really is. If, on the other hand, we have
bimonthly data for months -1 and +1 then the interpolated data point for month 0 will be lower
than it really is, and as a result the growth rate of FAFH prices from -1 to 0 will be lower than it
really is and from 0 to +1 the growth rate of prices will be higher than it really is. If we have a
mix of the two types of bimonthly data, and generate a monthly series for the growth of FAFH
prices then this will tend to create, in regressions that use this interpolated data, upward biases
for the coefficients for T-1 and T+1 and a downward bias for T=0. The conclusion is that
interpolation shifts the apparent price increases away from the month in which it was imposed
onto both the month before and the month after. The same shifting, for the same reason, will
occur from T-4 to T-3 because of the positive coefficient for T-4 in the monthly regressions
above.19

19

Pseudo-measurement errors might also be correlated with our monthly dummies because of predictable seasonal
movements of prices. If prices typically grow rapidly in, say, April and we interpolate between February and April
CPI data points then the interpolated value for March will tend to be greater than it really is as will the resulting
value for the grow rate of prices in March. Similarly, the growth rate of prices between March and April, using the
interpolated data, will be downward biased. If this seasonal issues does occur our monthly coefficients might be
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[Figure 1]
We now turn to the second issue: the impact of the interaction between the particular data
we use in this study and the particular estimation technique we use. We gain insight into the
consequences of interpolating the bimonthly data by, again, making use of our monthly data. We
note again that how restaurants respond to minimum wage hikes should not depend on whether
the BLS generates monthly or bimonthly FAFH CPI series for their metropolitan area. This
suggests the following experiment: for the metropolitan areas that do have monthly data, we can
simulate what the data would have been if it was actually have been collected bimonthly and
then use this data to run our regressions. We can then compare the regression results generated
from this simulated bimonthly data with the results produced by the true monthly data. The
differences we discover in this experiment using fabricated bimonthly data should be transferable
to metropolitan areas for which we have only bimonthly data.
We return, then, to the six series for which we have full monthly data, deleting half of each
city’s FAFH and CPI-All observations, and then linearly interpolating each series to create
observations to replace those we deleted. For half of the series we delete the
December/February/April/… FAFH price index observations, and for the other half we delete the
January/March/May/... observations. We then logged and first-differenced each of the fabricated
bimonthly (with interpolation) series to obtain our measure of inflation, and estimated a
regression model based on Equation 2.
[Table 6]
Regression 4 in Table 6 reports the result of using the fabricated bimonthly (with
interpolation) data. As predicted above, interpolation spreads out the contemporaneous impact of
the minimum wage hike to the month preceding and the month following the hike. As we move
from regression 3 (from Table 5) to regression 4, the contemporaneous impact falls from 0.039
to 0.021 while the coefficients for T-1 and T+1 rise (and achieve significance or nearsignificance). The sum of the coefficients for T-1 to T+1 is identical in regressions 3 and 4. Once
we get to the sum of T-4 to T+4, that for regression 4 does exceed that for regression 3 but this
increase is due mostly to what happened for T+4. In most, but not all, cases the standard errors
fell, as expected, but the magnitude of these changes were not large enough to (alone) cause
estimated coefficients to achieve significance.20

systematically biased. But this additional factor does not affect the estimated coefficients for the variables of interest
to us in this study and, so, we ignore it here.
20
The reason why not all standard errors fall is because we use Huber-White robust standard errors.
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Generalizing, interpolation in the context of this study tends to reduce the estimated
contemporaneous price increase, shifts some of the contemporaneous impact to the month before
and after the minimum wage hike, and should be assumed to reduce standard errors. Still, a
regression using some interpolated data does provide useful information about the total effect of
minimum wage hikes on the FAFH CPI.
Although we cannot say for sure what caused Aaronson (2001) to find statistically
significant increases in prices in month before and after minimum wage hikes, the above
discussion about the impact of interpolation suggests that Aaronson’s results were at least partly
(and maybe fully) due to his use of interpolation.
For comparison, regression 5 in Table 6 presents the results using data coming only from
those metropolitan areas for which the BLS generates bimonthly price data. No monthly data
was used. The regressions were generating from series using bimonthly (with interpolation) data.
For some cities, the BLS releases their FAFH price index on a January/March/May/… cycle,
while others follow the alternate cycle of December/February/April/…. In order to estimate
elasticities using these series, we linearly interpolated the original FAFH price index as well as
the city CPI-All. This new series, now made up of a combination of the actual bimonthly data
and data interpolated between the bimonthly data, was logged and first-differenced to construct
the measure of FAFH inflation that serves as our dependent variable.
The results seen in regression 5 are very similar to those seen in regression 4, but with
greater significance on certain coefficients possibly due to the higher number of observations
used to estimate regression 5. One difference seen is that the slowdown in the price increase
(ahead of the minimum wage hike) shifted forward one month to T-3. The various sums of
coefficients are very similar to those found in regressions 3 and 4.
The results of regression 5 is exactly what one would expect if the true underlying monthly
data (if it existed) was just like that which generated the results in regression 3. When properly
interpreted, the results of regressions using interpolated data give insight into the impact of
minimum wage hikes on prices. We turn next to combining monthly and bimonthly (with
interpolation) data to consider the impact of minimum wage hikes along with other issues
relevant to policy design.
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6. Main Results: How Do Prices Respond? Are the Results Consistent with Perfectly
Competitive Low-Skilled Labor Markets?
We now pool together monthly and bimonthly (interpolated) data for the 1978-2015 period.
Table 7 presents the results. We focus on the results of regression 7 which includes City CPI-All
as a control.
[Table 7]
According to regression 7, a 10% increase in the minimum wage boosts prices by 0.45% in
the three months centered on the month the hike is imposed. However, based on the discussion in
the previous section, we can say that regression 7 likely overstates the size of the price increases
on the month before and after the minimum wage hike is imposed and understates the size of the
price increase on the month the hike is actually imposed, though the sum of these coefficients
likely does indicate the fully impact of these three months. The sum of the coefficients [T-1,
T+1] in this regression, 0.045, is almost identical to that found in regression 3 (which used only
monthly data).21
As before, we also find minimum wage hikes lead restaurants to moderate their price
increases 3 to 4 months ahead of the hike. In regression 7, the coefficients for T-3 and T-4 are
both negative and statistically significant. A portion of the price decline assigned to T-3 in this
regression is likely due to a shifting of price increases occurring in T-4 by the process of
interpolation. The sum of the coefficients for these two months is 0.015, which is identical the
sum of coefficients of the same two months in regressions 3 and 5.
The total effect of minimum wage hikes in the 9 months centered on the month the hike is
imposed is 0.036, a number close to that seen in regression 5 but somewhat larger than seen in
regression 3. So, considering the full period over which a minimum wage affects prices, we find
that a 10% increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.36% net increase in prices. That is, if a
$10.00 item experienced this average price increase, it would become a $10.04 item.
The size of the price increase (and so the implied welfare loss) we find is lower than
previously reported: Aaronson (2001) reports a 10% increase in the minimum wage causes a net
0.67% increase in the nine months centered on the month the minimum wage hike is imposed.22
We find a price increase for the same period close to half of that reported by Aaronson (0.36% vs

21

Although the interpolation process generates standard errors that are biased downwards (as discussed above), the
p-values for most of these coefficients in regression 7 are so small that it is hard to believe that the reported
statistical significance was due simply to interpolation.
22
Table 4, regression 2.
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0.67%), and so our findings suggest a lower welfare loss to consumers following a minimum
wage hike.
The importance of our findings go beyond finding a reduce welfare impact on consumers
when a minimum wage hike is imposed. Building on a set of reasonable assumptions about the
operation of restaurants in a hypothetical perfectly competitive market, Aaronson and French
(2007) argue that restaurants in perfectly competitive markets will fully pass through any
increase in the minimum wage and that the full pass-through elasticity will be equal to
approximately 0.07. As they find, in various regressions, elasticities near 0.07 they conclude that
low-wage restaurant labor markets are best characterized as perfectly competitive. The
implication of this, in turn, is that any minimum wage increase will necessarily reduce
employment.
However, we get results inconsistent with highly competitive low-wage labor markets in the
restaurant industry: our elasticity of 0.036 for the nine months centered on the month of a
minimum wage hike and of 0.043 for the much narrower period of [T-1,T+1] fall short of the
0.07 hypothesized as being consistent with perfect competition. However, our findings do not
provide positive support for any particular alternative structure of low-wage labor markets. In the
next section we consider whether the data we have provides positive support for one alternative
labor market structure, monopsonistic competition.
7. Monopsonistic Competition in Low-Wage Labor Markets: Theory and Evidence
Monopsonistic competition has been offered in recent years as an alternative model for some
labor markets.23 Most notably, Card and Krueger (1995) proposed that monopsony-like
conditions in low-skilled labor markets might explain their finding that minimum wages
increased employment. Since then, Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Bhaskar and To (1999),
Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002), and others have proposed different causes for imperfect
competition on the buyer-side of labor markets, and developed formal models that drew out the
potential consequences of monopsonistic competition. All of these formal models of
monopsonistic competition, however, are consistent with Stigler’s (1946) observation of the
impact of a minimum wage when businesses have market power in labor markets: the impact of
a minimum wage on employment (and so on output prices) is context dependent. More narrowly,
Stigler pointed out that when employers had power over wages, a small rise in a minimum wage
generates increased employment (and, implied by this, increased output and reduced prices)
23

Few argue that pure monopsony in labor markets has been found outside of a few unusual labor markets (for
instance, in the market for professional baseball players in the United States before the ending of the reserve clause).
Many economists, however, persist in using the term “monopsony” as shorthand for monopsonistic competition.

16

while a large increase in the minimum wage reduces employment (and, implied, reduces output
and higher prices).
This can be seen in the standard model of monopsony in the labor market. The monopsonist
has market power and, therefore, faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve. To attract more
workers, the monopsonist needs to increase the wage, which necessitates increasing the wages of
those already hired. This implies the marginal cost of labor for the monopsonist is greater than
the wage and so, the marginal cost of labor curve is upward-sloping and rises faster than the
labor supply curve.
In Figure 2(a) (below) the equilibrium wage for the monopsonist, in the absence of a
minimum wage, is at Wm while employment stands at Lm. This equilibrium wage is below what
it would have been in a perfectly competitive setting,Wpc.
[Figure 2]
Figure 2(b) shows the impact of a “small” minimum wage increase. Suppose, just for the
sake of convenience, that initially the minimum wage stood at Wm. Suppose, next, that a new
minimum wage is implemented and the size of the increase is “small.” The new minimum wage
is established at Wsmw, which stands above Wm but below Wx, where labor supply equals labor
demand. The marginal cost of labor now includes the horizontal solid line starting at Wsmw. The
new marginal cost curve will induce the monopsonist to expand employment up to Lsmw as each
worker below that level of employment will now have a marginal cost below his/her value of
marginal product (given by the labor demand curve). As drawn, the small increase in the
minimum wage will increase employment as Lsmw > Lm. In turn, this increased employment will
(given plausible assumptions) lead to higher output (at least in the short-run) and, so, lower
prices.
Figure 2(c) shows the impact of a “large” increase in the minimum wage. With a “large”
increase, the minimum wage pushes the wage from Wm to above Wx , and employment falls as
Llmw < Lm. Under reasonable assumptions, this decline in employment is associated with a
decline in output and prices.
This context-dependent nature of the impact of minimum wage hikes on employment,
output, and prices within monopsonistic competition contrasts starkly with the prediction of a
model of perfect competition. In perfect competition, an increase in the minimum wage—no
matter what its size—will lead to a price hike that fully passes along the higher labor costs onto
consumers and will cause lower employment. Further, the perfectly competitive labor market
model gives no reason to suppose that the wage-price elasticity would vary systematically with
the size of a minimum wage change: the wage-price elasticity associated with a small minimum
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wage increase should not systematically vary from the wage-price elasticity associated with a
large minimum wage increase.
We will implement a rough test of the claim that low-wage labor markets in the restaurant
industry are best characterized as monopsonistically competitive by seeing whether “small”
increases in minimum wages have a different effect on FAFH prices than do “large” minimum
wage increases. We separate the minimum wage changes in our sample into two groups, “small”
and “large” increases depending whether the minimum wage change is below or above the
average minimum wage increase in our sample, 6.8%. We cannot be sure, of course, that this
average is close to Wx in our diagram.
Table 8 (regression 8) presents a regression based on these two types of minimum wage
changes. The standard controls appear in this regression.
[Table 8]
As can be seen, for the small minimum wage hikes a single coefficient achieves statistical
significance, that for [T-4], and this coefficient is negative. The sum of coefficients for the
months immediately surrounding the small minimum wage increase, [T-1,T+1], is also negative
although statistically insignificant. The sum of coefficients for the full nine-month period
surrounding small minimum wage hike, [T-4,T+4], is negative and significant.
These findings are inconsistent with the perfectly competitive model, which would deny a
higher minimum wage could be associated with no price increase and certainly not with a price
decline. These findings are consistent with a model of monopsonistic competition as the only
statistically significant coefficient for small minimum wage hike is negative. Also in support of a
monopsonistic competition model is the fact that the sum of coefficients for [T-4, T+4] in the
“small” cases is statistically significant and negative. Note however that this finding should be
viewed with some degree of caution because of the effect that interpolation has on standard
errors, thus possibly causing us to reject null hypotheses more often than is warranted.
In contrast, the coefficients for “large” minimum wage hikes are statistically significant and
positive for all of T, [T-1,T+1], and [T-4,T+4], with elasticities that closely match the results
reported for the full dataset in Table 7. The combined finding that large minimum wage hikes
boost prices while small minimum wage hikes have no (and possibly a negative) effect on prices
is consistent with the model of monopsonistic competition discussed earlier. Taken together,
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regression 7 provides evidence against perfect competition in low-wage labor markets while
regression 8 provides evidence that such labor markets are monopsonistically competitive.24
8. Policy Contexts Matter, Sometimes
Minimum wage policies can differ along many dimensions. For instance, a law could
provide for a single, large increase in the minimum wage or a series of small, annual increases
with no ending date. The impact on prices and employment of these two laws might be different
as the second type of law permits more long-term planning by businesses and that, in turn, might
lead to different consequences for prices, employment, and output. Policy details might matter
for the effect that a minimum wage hike has on output prices.
Further, minimum wages laws might also differ by the competitive context of businesses
facing a minimum wage increase. For instance, we might treat a federal minimum wage hike, as
far as the restaurant industry goes, as if it was implemented in a closed economy: cross-national
trade and capital mobility relevant to the restaurant industry is relatively unimportant. On the
other hand, a city minimum wage increase might be treated as if it involved an open economy:
the movement of customers and restaurants over the city boundary to or from a neighboring area
could be potentially be large enough to affect how businesses respond to the city minimum wage
hike.
In this section, we first consider whether the competitive context matters for the level of
pass-through. We then turn to consider whether policy details have systematic effects on the
level of pass-through.
8.1 Competitive Context: Federal vs State vs City Minimum Wage Hikes
A minimum wage hike might induce cross-border movement of restaurants. For instance, a
restaurant facing a minimum wage hike might believe relocating outside the area implementing
the minimum wage hike might bring it higher profits than if it had stayed. Or, a restaurant owner
might relocate outside the area implementing the minimum wage hike because of opposition to
what she/he might see as inappropriate government intervention into the local restaurant
industry.
In the case of a federal minimum wage hike, such relocation would likely be rare due to the
high cost of relocating outside the United States. State or city minimum wage hikes are much
24

Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002) reviews the empirical work associated with monopsonistic competition while
Staiger, Spetz, and Phibbs (2010) is a recent study showing strong evidence of monopsonistic competition in the
nursing labor market.
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more likely to lead to such relocation of restaurants. Further, it seems plausible that the shorter
the distance a restaurant must travel to find an area that has not increased its minimum wage, the
more likely a restaurant would relocate. If so, then relocation would seem more likely for
restaurants facing state minimum wage hikes that are located in metropolitan areas along a state
border or for restaurants facing a city minimum wage hike.
If sufficient relocation of restaurants does occur, this might lead to less competition within
the area that had increased its minimum wage, which, in turn, could potentially lead to a higher
increase in output prices than otherwise would have been the case. This effect would be largest
with city minimum wage hikes and in metropolitan areas along a state border facing state
minimum wage hikes, less in metropolitan areas away from state borders facing state minimum
wage hikes, and the least for a federal minimum wage hike.
A minimum wage hike might also induce cross-border movement of customers.25 If the
relative prices of restaurant meals in two different areas changed, customers would be inclined to
cross a border to eat at restaurants whose relative prices had fallen. The cost to consumers to
cross an international border (US-Mexico, US-Canada) seeking relatively lower-cost restaurant
meals would likely be much higher than the cost to customers crossing state or city borders. It
seems plausible to, once again, presume that this effect would be largest with city minimum
wage hikes and in metropolitan areas along a state border facing state minimum wage hikes, less
in metropolitan areas away from state borders facing state minimum wage hikes, and the least for
a federal minimum wage hike.
The impact of cross-border movement on restaurant prices depends on the structure of
output and labor input markets. In the case of highly competitive markets, a minimum wage hike
raises prices and some customers (who used to eat in the local area) would be inclined to seek
restaurant meals outside the area implementing the higher minimum wage. This would shift the
demand curve to the left for restaurant meals in the area that has raised the minimum and,
everything else remaining equal, this will cause restaurant prices to grow by less in the area that
had implemented the minimum wage hike than otherwise would have been the case. This lower
(than otherwise) price would be more likely in the case of a city minimum wage hike than in the
case of a federal minimum wage hike.
But, if imperfect competition existed (say, monopsonistic competition in low-skilled labor
markets) the impact depends on the size of the minimum wage hike. If the minimum wage hike
was “small,” restaurant prices would fall after the hike, and this might draw customers living
25

Cross-border movement of labor is also possible but we believe such movement would have only a small effect, if
any, on output prices following a minimum wage hike.
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outside the area implementing this hike. This increased demand for restaurant meals would keep
restaurant meal prices from falling as much as they otherwise would have. Alternatively, if the
minimum wage hike was “large,” restaurant prices would rise and any cross-border movement of
customers would be out of the area and this would lead prices to rise less than they otherwise
would have, just as in the case of the highly competitive situation.26 This cross-border movement
of customers would make prices higher or fall not as much as they otherwise would fall.
The net effect of the consequences of cross-border movement of businesses and of
customers cannot be known a priori. It is an empirical matter.
Regression 9 in Table 9 shows the results of separating federal, state, and city minimum
wage hikes. What stand out immediately are the major elasticities seen in the “city” cases
relative to the federal and state coefficients. This is consistent with the idea of exit of restaurants
from cities implementing minimum wage hikes, yet we believe it is premature to see these results
as providing support for this effect. The main reason to be cautious is that the dominant citylevel minimum wage appearing in our dataset is San Francisco, which is a special case, for
reasons we discuss below. However, one possible implication of the very different results we get
for cities in regression 9 is that it might be wrong to simply presume that a study of minimum
wage hikes in cities reveals what occurs with federal or state minimum wage hikes. We will
temporarily set aside a concern with city minimum wage hikes, but will return to them below
using a different methodology that might better reveal the true impact of city minimum wage
hikes on output prices.
[Table 9]
The federal and state results presented in regression 9 differ, suggesting that each might
have slightly different impacts on FAFH CPI. The sums of [T-1,T+1] for federal and state hikes
are, respectively, 0.048 and 0.036, both of which are significant. We also see that federal
minimum wage hikes lead to slower growth in prices several months in advance of the hike,
which reduces the total difference between federal and state minimum wage hikes, as seen by the
sums of [T-4,T+4] of 0.033 and 0.025 respectively. However, F-tests of the equality of
coefficients across federal and state cases reveals that none of these differences are statistically
significant. We can say, however, that this regression fails to provide evidence that the net effect
26

Restaurant meals are much closer to a pure service then they are to a tradable good. While home delivery of meals
can cross borders (city, state, or even international) much like a good, the delivery area is typically quite small.
Similarly, customers can, and do, travel many miles for restaurant meals (perhaps, again, crossing borders) but
typically the distance travelled is far shorter than a good would be if shipped across a border. Our discussion of the
impact of a minimum wage hike on prices is therefore only relevant to an industry like the near-pure-service
restaurant industry, and not necessarily relevant for minimum wage hikes that affect goods-producing industries.
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of cross-border movement in the case of state minimum wage hikes leads to any predictable
change in prices.27
8.2 City Minimum Wage Hikes
The results of regression 9 (above) indicated that city minimum wage hikes are either
different cases than federal or state hikes or we need to study city minimum wage hikes using a
different approach.
Two series in our sample have seen their own minimum wage laws: Washington, D.C. and
San Francisco (the latter has actually seen multiple cities, including Berkeley, Oakland, and San
Jose, pass their own minimum wage laws). We have good reason to believe that, at the least, the
city of San Francisco represents a unique case that requires special treatment. San Francisco is
the only case of indexing the minimum wage to the local—i.e. city—CPI, making wage-price
elasticities especially difficult to estimate because of the potential two-way influence between
minimum wage hikes and city price increases. Furthermore, a strong housing market, tourism
industry, and the rise of Silicon Valley have all led to unusually high rates of increase in the cost
of living and in restaurant prices in particular. On top of that, San Francisco also implemented
(starting in 2008) a health care ordinance that directly increased the costs of the restaurant
industry. Washington, D.C. is also unique for its tourism industry, presence of a large group of
young professional workers and public officials, and overall strong demand in the restaurant
industry.
For these reasons, we adopt an “event study” approach where we compare FAFH inflation in
the two cities to the average FAFH inflation in all other cities that did not see a minimum wage
change in that month. The “events” include all the minimum wage increases as well as the
change in costs due to the health care ordnance in San Francisco that went into effect in April
2008 and which are subsequently increased in January of each year. Previous studies of citywide
mandates have used a similar approach when focusing on a single city, where it is convenient to
compare a single case to a reference group (Dube, Naidu, and Reich 2007; Colla, Dow, Dube,
and Lovell 2014). The pass-through effects are modeled in Equation 3, with dummy variables
mw_changeit indicating the month t that a minimum wage affects that city i and with dummy
27

A possible criticism of this analysis is that for some minimum wage increases we will not be able to capture
evidence of business flight because the affected series samples from several states. Thus, for the New York City
price series, a firm affected by a minimum wage increase in New York may move to a part of New Jersey that is still
sampled in the New York City price series. Thus, no effect would be registered in the New York City series. To
address this criticism, as a robustness check we ran a second regression that restricted our sample to series that only
contain samples from a single state. The results of this second regression did not differ much from that reported
above.
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variables mw_referenceit indicating cities that, in that same month, did not experience a
minimum wage increase.
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The overall effect of the minimum wage change in a particular city can then be calculated by
subtracting each γt from δt. The results are reported in regression 10.
[Table 10]
The cumulative T-1 through T+1 coefficient is equal to 0.0028 for San Francisco (p-value of
0.0624) and 0.0014 for Washington, D.C., though the latter is not significant (p-value of 0.2085).
Since the cumulative coefficient for the reference group is -0.0006, this implies an overall effect
for San Francisco of about 0.0031, or a 0.31% increase in FAFH prices relative to cities that did
not see a minimum wage increase. While these appear to be in line with the main wage-price
elasticities reported in Table 6, note that because of indexing, changes in San Francisco’s
minimum wage have been significantly less than 10%, aside from the large initial increase in
January 2004. In other words, this coefficient suggests a slightly larger pass-through effect than
what was found in the main results. The lack of significance for the case of Washington, D.C.
suggests that our findings reflect the unique aspects of San Francisco’s economy mentioned
above.28
In sum, the event study approach illustrates that after accounting for the unique nature of the
low-wage labor market in each of these cities, the pass-through effect seems more consistent
with what was found in the “federal” and “state” regions. After accounting for local context and
using a different (though commonly-applied) methodology, we find that indexation of the
minimum wage to the local CPI does not lead to any kind of “wage-price” spiral.
8.3	
  Indexed	
  vs	
  Scheduled	
  vs	
  One-‐Shot	
  
The characteristics making federal, state, and city minimum wage hikes potentially different
from each other (discussed above) do not exhaust potentially relevant differences between

28

Some of the coefficients outside of the T-1 to T+1 range are also significant, but in all of these cases, we argue
that they are not economically significant. For example, the coefficient for T-3 in the Washington, D.C. case is
significant but after accounting for the inflation in the reference cases for that month, the measured impact is minor.
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minimum wage hikes. The actual details of the minimum wage law can potentially also be
important.
Some minimum wage laws have provided for one-shot increases, where at some date in the
future the minimum wage is increased and then the (current) law provides for no further
increases (until, perhaps, a new law then provides for another one-shot increase). Other
minimum wage laws have provided for a series of increases, perhaps occurring for a small
number of years, after which again they provide for no further increases beyond that. Other laws
have provided for a perpetual increases that do not end, and are (after perhaps an initial set
increase) tied to some cost-of-living index.
We now take advantage of this variation in minimum wage policy caused by recent
examples of indexation to compare that approach to the traditional minimum wage “hike”—or
the other popular approach of scheduling that “hike” across several years (the strategy adopted in
most of the federal minimum wage changes, for example). Since minimum wage increases are
usually not voted on or announced more than a few months before the proposed increase is
planned to go into effect, more predictable changes (due to scheduling or indexation) may allow
business owners to better prepare for and take account of increases in labor costs. Also, more
moderate changes (due to indexation which—after the initial large increase—generally results in
smaller changes in the minimum wage) could also allow firms to more easily absorb the increase
in costs. Reflecting on the findings in the previous section that two “low” minimum wage
changes are not the same as one “high” one, moderation along this dimension could temper the
contemporary pass-through effect. At any rate, since the competitive model would clearly not
predict any difference in wage-price elasticities across different kinds of policies, any evidence
of difference may suggest the presence of non-competitive elements.
The results are reported in regression 11 in Table 11, where we compare the cases of
indexed minimum wages, excluding the indexed minimum wage changes San Francisco (for the
reasons discussed above), with “one shot” cases in which the minimum wage increases a single
time, as well as “scheduled” cases in which the minimum wage increase is spread out over a
number of years. For both “scheduled” and “one shot” cases, the sum of the T-1 through T+1
coefficients is significant and much higher than the “indexed” case. For the “indexed” case, the
sum of the coefficients is not significant. An F-test of a comparison of the equality of
coefficients across the “indexed” and “scheduled” cases provides evidence to support the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. These results are consistent
with our finding earlier that moderate minimum wage changes do not lead to significant
increases in FAFH prices, and they provide additional evidence that indexation may temper the
pass-through effect.
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[Table 11]
9. Summary
Among the findings of this paper are the following. First, the impact of minimum wage
hikes on output prices (more precisely, on the FAFH CPI) is substantially smaller than
previously reported. Whereas the commonly accept elasticity of prices to minimum wage
changes is 0.07, we find a value almost half of that, 0.036. The value we found, 0.036, falls far
short of what would be expected if low-wage labor markets were perfectly competitive. Second,
increases in prices following minimum wage hikes generally occur on the month the minimum
wage hike implemented (and not in the month before or the month after). Previous research had
reported notable increases in prices the month before and the month after, but we present
evidence that such a finding was likely an artifact of interpolation.
Third, small minimum wage hikes have much lower (verging on zero) output price
elasticities than do large minimum wage hikes. Such a finding is consistent with the claim that
low-wage labor markets are monopsonistically competitive. If such labor markets are
monopsonistically competitive, then small increases in minimum wages might lead to increased
employment. Our study of restaurant pricing, then, indirectly addresses one of the more
contentious issues associated with the employment impact of minimum wage hikes. Fourth, we
find no evidence suggesting that exit of restaurants fleeing state minimum wage hikes is large
enough to affect output prices. [More on this based on extra regression.]
Fifth, we find evidence that the particulars of a minimum wage policy (indexed, one-shot,
scheduled) might affect how price changes occur within the relevant area. These results can be
used to design future minimum wage policies that best temper the pass-through effect.
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Tables and Figures

Table 1
Characteristics of Minimum Wages Considered in this Study
1978-1997
(Aaronson et al)

1998-2015

1978-2015

8

3

11

State

25

101

126

City

1

22

23

Indexed

0

43

43

One or two in series1 of
increases

20

25

45

Perpetually scheduled2

0

21

21

Characteristic
Federal

1
2

Four or less consecutive yearly minimum wage increases.
More than four consecutive yearly minimum wage increases.
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Table 2
City-, State-, and Federal-level Minimum Wage Changes Affecting Cities in Our Sample,
1977-2015
Political Unit Passing Minimum Wage
Increase

Month/Year of Increase1

Federal (11 total, leading to 193 binding
minimum wage increases)

1/1978, 1/1979, 1/1980, 1/1981, 4/1990, 4/1991,
10/1996, 9/1997, 8/2007, 8/2008, 8/2009

State (131 total binding minimum wage
increases)

Alaska (1978, 1979, 1980, 1981) 2
Massachusetts (7/1986, 7/1987, 7/1988, 1/1996,
1/1997, 1/2000, 1/2001, 1/2007, 1/2008,
1/2015)
New Hampshire (1/1987, 1/1988, 1/1989,
1/1990, 1/1991, 9/2007, 9/2008)
Connecticut (10/1987, 10/1988, 1/1999, 1/2000,
1/2001, 1/2002, 1/2003, 1/2004, 1/2006, 1/2007,
1/2009, 1/2010, 1/2014, 1/2015)
Maine (1/2002, 1/2003, 10/2004, 10/2005,
10/2006, 10/2007, 10/2008, 10/2009)
Wisconsin (7/1989, 6/2005, 6/2006)
Illinois (1/2004, 1/2005, 7/2007, 7/2008,
7/2009, 7/2010)
Ohio3 (1/2007, 1/2008, 1/2009, 1/2011 1/2012,
1/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)

1

In some cases, the effective month of the minimum wage change is shifted to the following month because the law
did not go into effect until later in that month. We used a cutoff date of the 24th day of the month: any minimum
wage change that occurred on or after that day was assumed to affect prices beginning the following month.
2
During these years, Alaska set its minimum wage at $0.50 greater than the federal minimum wage.
3
Starting in 2007, Ohio indexed its minimum wage to the national CPI.
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West Virginia (7/2006, 7/2007, 7/2008, 1/2015)
Maryland (1/2007, 1/2015)
Michigan (10/2006, 7/2007, 7/2008, 9/2014)
California (7/1988, 3/1997, 3/1998, 1/2001,
1/2002, 1/2007, 1/2008, 7/2014)
Florida4 (2/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2008,
1/2009, 6/2011, 1/2012, 1/2013, 1/2014,
1/2015)
New Jersey (4/1992, 10/2005, 10/2006, 1/2014,
1/2015)
New York (1/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007, 1/2014,
1/2015)
Pennsylvania (2/1989, 1/2007, 7/2007)
Delaware (4/1996, 1/1997, 5/1999, 10/2000,
1/2007, 1/2008, 6/2014)
Washington (1/1989, 1/1990, 1/1999, 1/2000,
1/2001, 1/2002, 1/2003, 1/2004, 1/2005, 1/2006,
1/2007, 1/2008, 1/2009, 1/2011, 1/2012, 1/2013,
1/2014, 1/2015)

City/County

Washington, D. C. (10/1993, 1/2005, 1/2006,
8/2008, 8/2009, 7/2014)
San Francisco5 (1/2004, 1/2005, 1/2006, 1/2007,
1/2008, 1/2009, 1/20106, 1/2011, 1/2012,
1/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)

4

Starting in 2005, Florida indexed its minimum wage to the South’s regional CPI.
San Francisco indexes its minimum wage to the city’s CPI.
6
While the minimum wage did not increase in San Francisco this year, there was a change to labor costs due to the
Health Care Security Ordinance (an employer spending mandate) that went into effect starting April 2008 (July
2008 for businesses with 20-49 employees), requiring employers to pay at an hourly rate per employee. For more
information on the ordinance, see https://www.wageworks.com/media/179290/2903-SFHCSO-ComplianceAlert.pdf. The change in labor costs resulting from this act has been factored into all relevant years.
5
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San Jose (3/2013, 1/2014, 1/2015)
Oakland (3/2015)
Berkeley (10/2014)
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Table 3
Series with Sample Areas in Multiple States
Series for the FAFH Price Index

Sample Areas Used for Restaurant Weights

Boston
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine (post1998), Connecticut (post-1998)
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha

Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin

Baltimore-Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C., Maryland, Virginia, West
Virginia

New York City-Northern New Jersey-Long
Island

New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania (post-1998)

Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware (post1998), Maryland (post-1998)

Note: for the individual counties and towns used for each area, see the sources below.
Restaurant establishment data (according to the individual county and town information)
found using the County Business Patterns Census Database (http://censtats.census.gov/cgibin/cbpnaic/cbpsect.pl).
Sources: “Metropolitan Areas and Components, 1998” (published through the U.S. Census),
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/historical/93mfips.txt. 1993 edition:
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/historical/83mfips.txt.
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Table 4
Minimum Wage Hikes by Series Periodicity
Minimum Wage Hikes
Periodicity

Observations

Federal

State

Local

Total

Monthly

1852

40

42

0

82

Bimonthly

3136

150

101

21

272

Both

4988

190

143

21

354
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Table 5
Estimates of Pass-Through Using Monthly Data
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(1)

(2)

(3)

Minimum Wage Change:
T-4
T-3
T-2
T-1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

[T-1,T+1]
[T-3,T+3]
[T-4,T+4]
City CPI-All

City fixed effects
Month, Year Controls
Observations
Cities
R2
Adj. R2

-0.004
(0.005)
0.006
(0.007)
0.012
(0.010)
0.008
(0.005)
0.052 **
(0.010)
0.022 **
(0.008)
0.012
(0.007)
0.012
(0.007)
0.010
(0.006)

-0.014 *
(0.006)
0.000
(0.007)
0.003
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.005)
0.039 **
(0.010)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.005)

-0.014 *
(0.006)
0.000
(0.007)
0.001
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.039 **
(0.010)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.005)

0.081 **
0.121 **
0.127 **

0.044 **
0.043
0.027

0.046 **
0.041
0.025

---

---

0.113 **
(0.031)

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

1852
6
0.043
0.036

1852
6
0.162
0.133

1852
6
0.170
0.141

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors reported.
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Figure 1
Interpolation and a Stylized Minimum Wage Hike
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Table 6
Illustrating the Effect of Interpolation
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(4)

(5)

Minimum Wage Change:
T-4
T-3
T-2
T-1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

[T-1, T+1]
[T-3, T+3]
[T-4, T+4]
City CPI-All

-0.012 **
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
0.010
(0.006)
0.021 **
(0.007)
0.015 *
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.004)
0.005
(0.006)

-0.007
(0.003)
-0.008 **
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.013 **
(0.004)
0.017 **
(0.005)
0.015 **
(0.005)
0.002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.004
(0.003)

0.046 **
0.043 *
0.036

0.045 **
0.042 **
0.039 **

0.084 **
(0.031)

0.132 **
(0.020)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

1851
6
0.285
0.260

6272
25
0.189
0.178

City fixed effects
Month, Year Controls
Observations
Metropolitan Areas
R2
Adj. R2

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors adjusted for
smaller degrees of freedom reported (see footnote 18).
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Table 7
Estimate of Pass-Through, Full Dataset
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(6)

(7)

Minimum Wage
Change:
T-4
T-3
T-2
T-1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

[T-1, T+1]
[T-3, T+3]
[T-4, T+4]

-0.010 **
(0.003)
-0.005 *
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
0.010 **
(0.003)
0.022 **
(0.005)
0.013 **
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)

-0.009 **
(0.003)
-0.006 *
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.010 **
(0.003)
0.023 **
(0.005)
0.013 **
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)

0.044 **
0.043 **
0.035 **

0.045 **
0.043 **
0.036 **

City CPI-All

---

0.130 **
(0.017)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

8124
28
0.170
0.161

8124
28
0.180
0.171

City fixed effects
Month, Year Controls
Observations
Metropolitan Areas
R2
Adj. R2

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors adjusted for
smaller degrees of freedom reported (see footnote 18).
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Figure 2
Impact of Minimum Wage Increase in Monopsonistic Competition

39

Table 8
Estimate of Pass-Through, Full Dataset
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(8)
Minimum Wage Change
T-4
T-3
T-2
T-1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

[T-1, T+1]
[T-3, T+3]
[T-4, T+4]

Small

Large

-(0.035) *
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.010)
0.013
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.015
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.010)

-(0.007) **
(0.003)
-0.006 *
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.011 **
(0.003)
0.023 **
(0.005)
0.014 **
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)

-0.003
-0.033
-0.069 *

0.048 **
0.045 **
0.040 **

City CPI-All

0.132**
(0.017)

City fixed effects
Month, Year Controls

Yes
Yes

Observations
Metropolitan Areas
R2
Adj. R2

8124
28
0.178
0.172

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors adjusted for
smaller degrees of freedom reported (see footnote 18).
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Table 9
Pass-Through Effects by Policy Context
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(9)
Minimum Wage
Change
T-4

Federal
-0.014 **
(0.004)

T-3
T-2
T-1

-0.008 *

T+2
T+3
T+4

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.003

0.008 *

(0.003)

(0.003)

-0.001

-0.006

0.009

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.005)

0.005

0.004

(0.003)

(0.006)

0.011 *
0.023 **
(0.006)

T+1

City
0.008 *

(0.004)

(0.005)
T

State
-0.001

0.014 **

0.022 **
(0.006)
0.010

0.012
(0.008)
0.014 *

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.007)

0.000

0.000

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.009)

0.005

-0.002

0.016

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.009)

0.002

0.004

-0.004

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.007)

0.019 *

[T-1, T+1]

0.048 **

0.036 *

0.030 *

[T-3, T+3]

0.044 **

0.026 **

0.082 **

[T-4, T+4]

0.033

0.025 **

0.086 **

City CPI-All

0.128 **
(0.017)

City fixed
effects
Month, Year
Controls
Observations
Cities
R

Yes
8124
28

2

Adj. R

Yes

0.181
2

0.170

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors adjusted for smaller
degrees of freedom reported (See footnote 18).
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Table 10
Pass-Through Effects by Policy Context
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(10)1
Minimum Wage
Change
T-4

Washington,
D.C.

San
Francisco
0.0009

0.0002

(0.0007)

(0.0006)

(0.0002)

0.0007

-0.0001

0.0001

(0.0005)

(0.0004)

(0.0002)

0.0006

-0.0005

0.0001

(0.0007)

(0.0005)

(0.0002)

0.0004

-0.0001

-0.0003

(0.0006)

(0.0004)

(0.0002)

0.0000

0.0015

(0.0007)

(0.0009)

(0.0002)

0.009

0.0014

0.0001

(0.0009)

(0.0009)

(0.0002)

0.0004

0.0003

(0.0008)

(0.0009)

(0.0002)

-0.0001

0.0001

0.0001

(0.0005)

(0.0009)

(0.0002)

0.0000

0.0001

0.0001

(0.0009)

(0.0008)

(0.0002)

[T-1, T+1]

0.0014

0.0028

-0.0006

[T-4, T+4]

0.0032

0.0036

0.0004

T-3
T-2
T-1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

-0.0017 **

Reference
Group

0.0023 **

City CPI-All

-0.0004 *

0.124 **
(0.0172)

City fixed effects

Yes

Month, Year Controls

Yes

Observations

8124

Cities

28

R2

0.172

Adj. R2
0.162
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors adjusted for smaller degrees of
freedom reported (see footnote 18).

1

Coefficients are based on dummy variables, and therefore do not measure wage-price elasticities directly.
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Table 11
Pass-Through Effects by Policy Context
Dependent variable: FAFH inflation
(11)
Minimum
Wage Change
T-4
T-3
T-2
T-1
T
T+1
T+2
T+3
T+4

[T-1, T+1]
[T-4, T+4]

Indexed
0.006 *
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.008
(0.005)
0.011 *
(0.005)
0.001
(0.007)
0.003
(0.007)
0.010 *
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)

Scheduled
-0.014 **
(0.004)
-0.008
(0.004)
0.000
(0.005)
0.012 *
(0.005)
0.024 **
(0.007)
0.015 **
(0.006)
0.001
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)

One-Shot
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.003
(0.003)
0.025 **
(0.007)
0.014 **
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)

0.051 **
0.037

0.040 **
0.023 *

0.020 *
0.044 **

City CPI-All

0.128 **
(0.017)

City fixed
effects
Month, Year
Controls

Yes
Yes

Observations
Cities

8124
28

R2
0.181
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors adjusted for
smaller degrees of freedom reported (see footnote 18)
	
  

43

.

Table 9: Tests of the Equality of Coefficients Across Policy Contexts
Low
vs.
High
p-value (equality 0.4863
of
contemporaneous
coefficients)
p-value (equality 0.0149
of T-1 through
T+1 coefficients)

Indexed
vs.
Scheduled

Indexed
vs. Oneshot

Federal
vs. State

Federal vs.
State
(robustness
check)

0.1478

0.1071

0.9350

0.9203

0.0432

0.0925

0.3838

0.1894

Table 9, Continued
S.F. vs.
D.C. vs.
Reference Reference
Group
Group
p-value (equality
of
contemporaneous
coefficients)
p-value (equality
of T-1 through
T+1 coefficients)

0.0414

0.7256

0.0227

0.0942
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